The defense capitalized on this. At every turn, particularly through former Justice Serafin Cuevas, it never failed to do a lecture on proper court procedures, rules of court, and rules of evidence. The prosecution generally fail to see through the trap, arguing futilely for “liberal” interpretation of these rules and procedures. The Senate, on its part, has vacillated between allowing the testimonies and accepting the evidences and a strict application of these rules, according to the defense.

The dilemma of both the prosecution and the senator-judges is this: Where to you draw the line between judicial framework and the impeachment framework, particularly when the latter is a sui generis case (a case in its own category)?

The defense is sure of its strategy, and that is, to use every rule in the judicial book in order to prevent the acceptance of testimonies and evidences. To do so, it continually invokes the rules, criteria, and standards of a criminal case, which requires proof beyond reasonable doubt.

The prosecution, on the other hand, seems to rely on making sure that its facts are aired in public and in open court and not necessarily to be accepted by the court. This is, of course, in consonance with the basic assertion that an impeachment court is only for the determination of the fitness of the accused for the public office which he or she occupies.

In this case, Chief Justice Renato Corona has a triple handicap.

First, the impeachment process by reason of its being a sui generis type, may not necessarily use the judicial rules, including the rules of evidence and even jurisprudence on this matter. The tendency, in fact, is to relax the rules in order to get at the facts of the case.

Second, the sensitive nature of the position held by the Chief Justice (and other SC justices)–akin to a referee in a sports game–requires much higher standards than the other impeachable officials. Here, the oft-said standards is of “Caesar’s wife”–meaning, cannot even be suspected of indiscreet behavior, hint of partiality, or loss of integrity.

Third, CJ Corona is deeply unpopular with the public, with survey ratings showing him consistently in the negative since his very controversial appointment as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. In fact, he is the only one among the chief justices who has this rating since the survey on this matter started. In this regard, the IBP board and court employee support do not count as much.

In a political setting of a Senate trial by senator-judges–many of whom are non-lawyers–the defense faces an uphill battle. Getting at the facts would necessarily trump court brilliance.

The one thing that can trump the facts is the political vote by a critical number of senator judges. Political vote in this case refer to various political scenarios dependent on the larger political considerations such as the 2013 and 2016 elections, popularity of President Aquino, economic crisis, and governance problems.

For the defense and CJ Corona, obviously delaying the proceedings open the possibility of this political vote–in their favor. Otherwise, when the time comes, the facts will become decisive in the Senate vote–possibly with a favorable political climate in favor of the vote.

These four days can be characterized as a game of patintero. The prosecution, nervous as a mouse, tries to get past the big legal cats guarding the line. However, at the of the four days, it is the defense cats that are getting nervous. The first three city registrar of deeds (Taguig City, Quezon City, and Marikina City) had taken the witness stand and produced titles and deed of sales of various properties owned by the CJ Corona and his family. Taken on their face, these documents already pointed to big discrepancies in the list of properties and their price-values entered in the SALNs and as recorded in the register of deeds.

The only thing that the defense at this point can do is to impugn these documents, prevent their entry into the court record, and otherwise question their relevancy. The latter is based on the line of questioning that the defense had taken. Both inside and outside the trial proper, the defense asserted that producing the SALN already satisfies and answers the second article of impeachment and that the titles and deeds produced by the witnesses are irrelevant.

The defense argued on technicalities–they know that the factual side of the argument offers them nothing to base their defense. If it fails to prevent the entry into the court record of these evidence, then there is the possibility of an abbreviated trial. The senator-judges may just decide to change the rules and vote immediately.

The uphill battle of CJ Corona has just gone steeper. He will need all the expertise and skills of his veteran defense team. However, this may not be enough.

Abangan ang susunod na kabanata.

Even as the impeachment has legal rules and is mandated by the Constitution, yet it cannot be denied that it is essentially a political process. This is starkly underlined in the impeachment trial of SC Chief Justice Renato Corona. 23 senators, of whom only nine are lawyers, will decide whether he is still fit to serve as a justice of the Supreme Court.

All the 23 senators will decide on the basis of their individual appreciation of the evidence, sense of justice, and requirements of the position. Without admitting, all of them will have one eye on the public pulse–their national constituency–and on the political will of the Chief Executive. Of course, also without admitting it, they know they themselves and the Senate as an institution are also in trial.

Inevitably, the need to restore (or affirm, if the Corona camp is to be believed) the faith and trust in the impartiality, dignity and honor of the Supreme Court will become paramount. This suggests–even demands–that the decision will be political.

Again, this is not in the sense of partisan political alignments–though this will have its own influence. It is political because it addresses not the legal bases and ramifications of the process but the institutional and policy imperatives of democratic governance.

I think, at the end of the day, the senator-judges will realize that they have very few options–and all of these are political. Meanwhile, the Show will go on…

Of course, the focus will be on CJ Corona. However, the articles of impeachment can very well apply to the majority of the associate justices of the Supreme Court. It is in this sense that the impeachment trial may well be the trial of the institution itself.

However, the nature of an impeachment process is one of a corrective measure, targeted at those officials at the top of the power chain who otherwise cannot be removed. In this case, the cleansing of the ranks of the SC justices is being done in order to regain the trust of the people in the institution. It therefore is well within the accountability principle in a democratic governance regime.

It is not true that impeachment weakens the Supreme Court or the judiciary. Nor does it constitutes a constitutional crisis or–more far-fetched–a return to a dictatorship. Precisely, an impeachment process, as a constitutional process, is a democratic instrument that provide a check on the powers of the highest officials–including the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

Impeachment also provides a rare opportunity for people to really get to know the lives and behavior of these officials and decide for themselves whether they are fit or not for the powerful jobs they were elected or appointed to. The people remains the ultimate actor and judge in the process.

CJ Corona has a slim chance to survive unscathed the impeachment trial. The more probable outcome–whatever the vote of the senators–is that his credibility before the people will be damaged beyond repair and there is no choice but to leave the institution. This also goes for those justices who voted with him on crucial issues enumerated in the articles of impeachment.

The truth of the matter here is that the impeachment process is essentially a political process. Not really the partisan politics one associates with the latter but a more fundamental process associated with the exercise of people’s sovereignty in a democracy.

I think CJ Corona and his cohort in the Supreme Court are at a crossroad. They face a hostile public going into the impeachment trial and they face an uphill battle to convince the people of their fitness for their SC positions. The plunge to negative ratings (-14% in the SWS polls) seems to indicate a certain conclusion. They have one choice–to go now before an impeachment trial starts or go later because of the failure to convince the sovereign people.

Whatever, the judges will have been judged.

The first six months of his term  was a so-so period when the newness to the post showed itself in various ways: his anti-poverty policies were at one time termed simplistic, his handling of the Luneta incident termed amateurish, and his various Executive Orders termed legally weak. However, it was a genuine learning curve that the people accepted.

Going into 2011, the nervousness was beginning to show–with the surveys showing a downward spiral. Though still high, it would seem to reach a critical level by end-2011. Opposition and critics had a field day feasting on an “amateur president” presiding over a “student council” of a cabinet. There were attempts to stir up trouble in the military and the hack media made a killing from the funders of destabilization.

All for naught. At the end of 2011, the surveys showed the President regaining the high level of popular support that won him the landslide in 2010. Now, his programs are holding their ground, particularly the pledge to combat corruption and prosecute the “big fishes” of the Arroyo administration who figured in major cases in the past decade. GMA and Abalos are in jail, Palparan is on the run, Gutierrez is out of the Ombudsman office, and SC Chief Justice Corona has been impeached.

It is not a coincidence that people have high hopes for the new year, a high 95% according to SWS survey. It is the expectation for better governance and a better life in the coming year under the Aquino government.

2011 was the year Aquino proved his political will, backed up by a huge popular support from the sovereign people. The entire spectrum of political forces in the country has taken note of it and are acting accordingly. 2012 will prove whether he knows how to wield the awesome power of his political position in the greater interests of the whole nation and people.

2012 will be an interesting political year.