Now that the 2010 elections are just around the corner, surveys are coming out of the woodwork–fast and furious. Aside from the professional survey outfits that have gained national credibility in previous elections, some others are trying to get into the big league or have come across as fly-by-night outfits.

Take for example the race for presidency. The Social Weather Station (SWS) and Pulse Asia came out with their latest results. The SWS survey covered the period from November 4-8, 2009 while Pulse Asia covered December 8-10, 2009.

The results are basically identical to each other and to the ones in October and September, 2009. Benigno “Noynoy” Aquino III continues to maintain his estimated 45-47% share of the votes compared to Manuel “Manny” Villar’s 21-23% share. This is basically a 2-1 advantage.

This is bad news for the Villar camp and other presidential candidates. August 5 is already four months ago by last December 8. For Noynoy  to maintain his survey standing this long proves that he has a solid political base to stand on and that the Cory factor is not the only one that propelled him to the forefront.

Villar and Joseph “Erap” Estrada benefited from the withdrawal of  “Chiz” Escudero from the presidential race. Noynoy and Gilbert “Gibo” Teodoro were less benefited.

Erap got 19% of the Pulse Asia survey and had the most gains, coming from an 11% standing in October. It is evident that Manny Villar would have to get this Erap vote to even reach a position to seriously challenge Noynoy’s standing. Failure to do so will prove fatal to his bid. The same can be said for Erap’s own bid.

If the trends persist to the end of January 2010, the whole opposition to Noynoy will have to pool resources behind a single candidate to seriously challenge him.

Or, adopt desperate measures, perhaps, to stop a juggernaut?

Martial law in Maguindanao is due to be lifted in under one hour from now. The reason given by the National Security Council is that it already accomplished its mission of bringing back civilian authority, defeating the Maguindanao “rebels,” and arresting the Ampatuan clan perpetrators of the Maguindanao massacre.

Well and good, bu this has still to be taken with a grain of salt. Congress was due to vote on the declaration of martial law on December 15 and word is that it will be revoked for lack of factual and constitutional basis. Likewise, the Supreme Court is about to start hearing arguments against it and there are indications it will also issue an unfavorable decisions against it.

It is also to be noted that the declaration of martial law–though dividing the public for sometime–found no popular support even among those who supported the search for justice for the Maguindanao massacre victims. Senator Miriam Defensor’s expose of an extended martial law leaves no room to maneuver for any alleged plotter.

So, what exactly did martial law declaration accomplished? To cite one, it broke the psychological barrier that stemmed from the bad experience of martial law under the Marcos dictatorship and paves the way for a repeat performance in the future. Not that it would succeed–the popular condemnation it got from a broad range of the political spectrum means it is a very difficult proposition to sell.

The lifting, by no means, will buy popularity for administration candidates. It actually will make life more difficult for them as people and the voters will become more wary of the way administration people wields power.

It is a step backward for them. However, the future is another thing.

The declaration of martial law in the province of Maguindanao have more implications than its own objectives. Ostensibly, the declaration aims to preempt a rebellion from the Ampatuan clan, facilitate the arrest or capture of the perpetrators of the Maguindanao massacre, and reestablish civilian authority in the province.

The argument has been made that the declaration of martial law can achieve these objectives. Counter-arguments have also been put forward that the same objectives can be achieved by the use of normal means available to state authorities, even the declaration of a state of emergency.

Martial law or not, the key measurement of the appropriateness of the method used is that it achieves the objectives with the least collateral damage and with no additional or subsequent problems. In this, the martial law approach fails miserably.

First, there is as yet no rebellion and therefore no justification for martial law. What is there is a specious argument of a threatening rebellion (expressly incised out by the 1987 constitution from the previous constitutions). There is simply no factual basis for the declaration of martial law.

Second, for the sake of argument, if ever martial law is declared in relation to the Maguindanao massacre, it should have been done immediately after the incident, when the state authorities have actually attempted to arrest the Ampatuans and other perpetrators and their efforts are met with armed resistance. Conceivably, martial law could have been resorted then if the local civilian authorities–including the local officials and police–either belong to the Ampatuan clan or else their supporters and therefore these fail to perform their duties;  the perpetrators are protected by armed means; and the local population is under a state of terror.

Doing this after a period of delay and with no evident escalation of the situation opens to speculations of other objectives, particularly when the conditions for the declaration of martial law are not met.

There is fear that the declaration of martial law may be extended by an Arroyo-influenced joint Congress session to more than the 60 days allowed by the Constitution to possibly include the election day itself and thus possibly influence the outcome of the elections in ARMM and even the national elections. There is also fear that the joint session itself can lead to the resurrection of the Charter change initiative. The worst fear is the possible no-elections because of the breakdown of law and order in ARMM and even on the nationwide scale.

The declaration of martial law will not contribute much to the solution of the Maguindanao massacre. It may even lead to problems of the nation. It is a gambit–which if not opposed vigorously–can well lead to a sharp turn against Philippine democracy. The closest vigilance is therefore called for even as the nation does not let go of the search for justice to the victims of the Maguindanao massacre.

Martial law was declared, through Proclamation 1959, this morning, December 5, 2009, in Maguindanao province, except for some areas covered by the ceasefire with the MILF. The reason, according to Executive Secretary Ermita is because “heavily armed groups in the province of Maguindanao have established positions to resist government troops, thereby depriving the executive of its powers and prerogatives to enforce the laws of the land and to maintain public order and safety.” Subsequently, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Victor Ibrado announced that joint police and military teams have arrested Maguindanao Gov. Andal Ampatuan Sr. and his son, Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Gov. Zaldy Ampatuan.

It is curious that it is Ermita–not the President nor her official spokesperson–who disclosed the proclamation to the public. It is curiouser that senior civilian and military officials on the ground and involved in the Maguindanao crisis were not aware of the proclamation. For the first time, the name of the National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales comes up when reporters asked Secretary Ronaldo Puno if there is martial law proclaimed. “Ask Bert Gonzales,” he said.

Martial law is certainly the more viable option compared to the declaration of a state of emergency since the latter allows the Ampatuans–who held sway over the civilian authority in Maguindanao and up to the ARMM level–to stay and even maintain control over their domains. Martial law will allow the national authority to reassert power in Maguindanao and sweep away the Ampatuan reign of terror.

While this may be an immediate effect of martial law, it is also a problematic solution. If it is a sham or a diversionary tactic to shield or distance the president from her responsibility in the massacre, it may not really do away completely with the Ampatuan’s political hold on Maguindanao and may open–in the future–a fiercer contest among the Maguindanao’s clans. If it becomes a real solution, the Ampatuans may resort to retaliatory political tactics that will damage much of the president’s and the administration’s electoral chances.

There is a side to the proclamation that needs constant monitoring. Most of the ingredients for a Maguindanao massacre or other forms of political terrorism exist in other warlord areas in the country–fierce political dynastic contests, presence of armed groups, and relative breakdown of nonpartisan governmental and military chain of command. If these types of incident occur in these areas, an argument can be made to implement martial law or similar emergency measures on a nationwide scale. Then we may truly have a possible no-election scenario.

The declaration of martial law in Maguindanao–done by a small but influential group in Malacañang–may not be an endgame but an opening bid in a volatile electoral situation.

What is so special about elective government positions that people would spend millions–even billions of peso–to get elected to a job paying only a comparatively measly few hundreds of thousand a year? What is so attractive in becoming a president, senator, congressman, governor or even a mayor that people would try to do almost anything, including cheating and even killing women, journalists, and innocent bystanders, just to ensure a victory at the polls?

The answer, of course, is POWER (all-caps with fireworks to boot!). Unfortunately for it, Philippine democracy is just a set of inconvenient rules in this game of power and power-brokering. Traditional politics focuses on the capture and the maintenance and consolidation of the Power–for most traditional politicians this means keeping it in the family or clan.

In this sense, democratic elections are tolerated because these cannot be set aside without overthrowing the post-Marcos political system. This is something which will take too much effort to do and therefore is only seen as a last resort. In the meantime, the traditional politicians pursue the Power using every loophole of the electoral laws–and even brazenly contravening these laws if they think they can get away with it.

However, power–though a legitimate objective in every electoral contest–is not or will never be whole framework of democratic elections or of democratic governance. In the theory of democracy, power resides naturally or inherently in the governed. Consent of the governed is therefore sought in the setting-up and functioning of the State and government, particularly in the electoral process.

Power of a public official–in a democracy–is necessarily limited by the social contract or constitution, the derivative laws of the land, and public opinion. A public servant, the public official cannot change the mandate given him or her without the consent of the governed.

Precisely, political delicadeza dictates that an unpopular president should take the broad hints given by the people. That she should refrain from running again–even for a relatively minor position–and embarrassing the incoming president or, worse, go into Congress and maneuver to dislocate or even replace the new president.

However, the taste of power is addictive. And near-absolute power trumps any addictive drug known to mankind.