The news was a bit of a surprise. After shopping for a senatorial slot in LP, NP, and PMP, Ferdinand “Bongbong”Marcos, Jr. finally found a nesting place in presidential candidate’s Manny Villar’s Nacionalista Party. With this move, the Marcos family will again try–for the umpteenth time–to go back to national politics. On his side, Mr. Villar will try to help breach the historical barrier against the Marcos dictatorship that EDSA I and the antidictatorship movement erected.

The move to bring Bongbong into its fold deliberately sets the NP on a course to capture the pro-dictatorship political base of the Marcoses. This base is, of course, unreachable from the LP side, particularly because of Noynoy Aquino’s own political base that is rooted in the EDSA I and anti-dictatorship struggle. It’s maybe good trapo politics but the consequences will be far-reaching.

Villar gambles that the bitter memories of the dark days of the Marcos dictatorship will have been forgotten or attenuated to the point of a non-factor in the 2010 elections. He, I think, pragmatically saw the advantages of a major slice of the Ilocano vote, access to the huge Marcos ill-gotten wealth, and the projection of a “unifying leader” in the electoral contest. An interesting part of his calculation must be that the loss of possible votes from the Left or from the middle class will not be enough to offset these advantages.

What Villar actually will achieve with this move is the stirring up of a hornet’s nest. The Left, particularly the Makabayan group that he earlier wooed to his side, has no choice but to distance and direct its campaign against his candidacy. To do otherwise will be a political suicide that will reverberate to the heart of the underground movement.

The people power that manifested itself in the August events surrounding Cory Aquino’s death will make the connection between Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the Marcoses. That connection has been provided by the Villar and NP campaign. Thus, the translation from an anti-GMA sentiment to an anti-Villar movement is a strong possibility.

It may be a great tactical move as seen from from Villar’s strategists to focus the 2010 presidential elections to a fight between Manny Villar and  Noynoy Aquino. However, it brings more complications to an already complicated political contest. It also widened the options and opened new possibilities for the LP’s and Noynoy’s own campaign.

In the end, this NP move may prove to be self-defeating.

The reported bolting by a member of the LP senatorial slate–former senator Sergio Osmeña, Jr.–is an example of the peril of pursuing traditional politics in a setting of reform politics. Serge’s ostensible reason is his rejection of the LP’s choice of another senatorial candidate–erstwhile administration ally and another former senator, Ralph Recto. Recto was earlier reported to be eyeing a senatorial slot in the NP senatorial slate with his Wednesday Club buddy, Senator Manny Villar.

Recto’s senatorial term was marred by a controversial sponsorship–willingly or under duress from Malacañang (depending on whose story you hear)–of the infamous e-VAT law. This was a major reason for his failure to secure another term in the 2007 senatorial elections. He later serve in the Macapagal-Arroyo cabinet.

The first question to be asked, of course, is: Why Recto? The second question is: Is the Osmeña reaction correct?

The Recto decision was–from the first–a sound political decision for Liberal Party, that is, if the traditional political way of calculation is followed. The Recto couple’s political base + Vilma Santos’ nationwide fan base = national campaign asset. Part of the calculation may be that Recto’s early resignation from the cabinet and publicized tiff with Secretary Angelo Reyes would effectively negate any bad political effect of his dancing with the “enemy.”

The problem of this decision lies in its defiance of Noynoy Aquino’s alternative route to the presidential candidacy–a route based on the people’s clamor to reject the traditional politics and all that it implies. This places an intangible–yet potent–criteria on candidates associated with him, whether in the national and local levels.

The criteria are simple: one has to renounce the traditional way of politics of convenience, self-interest, and wheeling-dealing and to embrace a creed of honesty, genuine public service, and transparency. The rejection of the Arroyo administration by those who nominated Noynoy to the presidential table is total–anybody associated with it has the burden of admitting their mistakes and making penance before the people. In this sense, Recto falls far short of what is required of a Noynoy-endorsed senatorial candidate.

The LP is walking along a perilous traditional path strewn with political mine fields like the Recto case. It is a path potentially deadly to Noynoy’s commanding lead over his rivals and eventually, maybe to his very candidacy.

This may yet be cured and I think Senator Osmeña’s reaction is a bit premature. However, he saw the abyss.

The picture at the presidential and vice-presidential contest level is now clearer. The top contenders for the posts are the tandem of Noynoy Aquino-Mar Roxas under the LP banner against the tandem of Manny Villar-Loren Legarda. The other candidates are simply to far away at this time to present a serious challenge to both tandems.

In the latest Pulse Asia survey from October 20-30, 2009, The former leads the latter in both contests with Aquino (44%) winning over Villar (19%) and Roxas (37%) winning over Legarda (23%). Aquino’s lead is almost insurmountable and it will take a massive effort just to be within hitting distance when the formal campaign starts in February 2010. Legarda also has her work cut out to maintain a credible challenge to Roxas.

At first glance, there seems to be the revival of the two-party system of the 1960’s pre-martial law period. This is not supported by the events. Rather, LP and NP are both vehicles of the principal candidates and mainly used for political negotiations both at the national and local levels. The senatorial choices announced so far by the two camps reflect the same hodgepodge of “guest candidates” borne out of these negotiations.

Aquino’s constituency far outstrips the Liberal Party constituency even as Mar has his own negotiated vote base that straddles not only LP but other parties as well. When Legarda touted an NP-NPC alliance behind her team-up with Villar, it covers only those NPS members aligned with her and does not reflect an actual unified party decision.

No, there is no revival but a twist on the traditional politics where the convenient fiction of a coalition is dispensed with in favor of the party acting as an umbrella for “guest” candidates.

The December 1 deadline for filing of candidacy is barely three weeks away. Yet, there is still a scrambling for vice-presidency and the senatorial slate among the presidential-led electoral coalitions. Even the composition of coalitions is in the state of flux.

Of course, the root of this current state of disarray is  the entry of Noynoy Aquino into the presidential fray as the runaway “winnable”. He has rapidly evolved as the overpowering threat to the chances of all other presidential wannabees.

Already burdened by a lameduck status, the Lakas-Kampi ruling coalition grows desperate to complete its national candidate slate and raise the rating level of its standardbearer, Secretary Gibo Teodoro. However, time is catching up, with the start of open exodus of key members to either LP or NP. Soon–the floodgates having opened–it will become a deluge.

The experience of past ruling coalitions comes to mind: the Mitra-led coalition in the 1992 elections, and the de Venecia-led ruling coalition in the 1998 elections. In both cases, the trumpeted numbers, funds, and organization simply dissipated in face of an opposition-bent electorate.

2004 elections was different in that the incumbent president ran for reelection. However, even Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo suffered the ignominy of a close, controversial contest, the subsequent crisis of the presidency, and the dubious record of being the most unpopular president ever.

The kiss of death that is the identification with and endorsement of GMA has kept Secretary Teodoro’s  survey ratings in the cellar. The decision of the senior leaders of the Lakas-Kampi coalition, including the President, and giving Gibo a free hand in selection his leaders and his candidate slate is a desperate maneuver that is already too late. What it essentially did was to free the hands of GMA, Ermita and the others who resigned for their own negotiations with the remaining presidentiables with serious chances of winning. At this time, this is only Noynoy Aquino and Manny Villar.

The incumbent power that is the Arroyo administration expectedly has become the lightning rod for all the perceived problems of the electorate. Both the leading contenders also expectedly project their opposition credentials. However, the parameters of the 2010 elections has already been laid down–it is between the candidate of the status quo and the candidate of change. The administration, of course, represents the status quo; who represents change?

One of the most observable phenomenon in this post-Ondoy and pre-Christmas season is the proliferation of ads, banners, flyers, and any and all ads of would-be candidates. The latter range from the presidential wannabees down to the littlest councilor wannabees. If you still don’t know it, we are already in the midst of the 2010 election campaign period.

To be sure, according to the Commission on Elections, the 2010 elections are not yet here, not even the filing of certificates of candidacy (the deadline is still to come on December 1, 2009). The official election period will start on January 10, 2010; that of the official campaign period for presidential, vice-presidential, senatorial and party-list candidates is on February 9, 2010,  and that for the district representatives and local candidates is on March 26, 2010.

Yet, we are already witness to a “non-campaign” campaigning by virtually all the prospective candidates. One of the reasons, of course, is the recent Supreme Court ruling defining as pre-campaigning (and thus subject to penalties for election violation) any promotion of, for and in behalf of a candidate who filed his or her candidacy during the period starting on December 2, 2009 until February 8, 2010.

Another is that the early deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy inevitably led to the early decision to run or not to run, to coalesce or not to coalesce, to make up the slate for co-candidates, or to otherwise prepare for elections. Preparations requiring the input of the public perception of a candidate (such as campaign contribution, alliance-making, or media planning) had to be done in a hurry and in the quickest time possible. Name-recall is the name of the game this early.

And so, we have these infomercials, birthday greetings, advance christmas greetings, provincial sorties and other trappings of a full-blown political campaign. At the level of the presidential contest, this is a doubly urgent necessity because of the way surveys are showing the strength of the Noynoy Aquino presidential bid. BCA3 has to be cut down to the level of a “normal” candidate and his momentum drastically brought to a halt.

Whatever, my two-cents opinion is that all of these activities constitute pre-campaigning. Meaning, these should be banned and punished for undermining the constitutional mandate for a free and fair 2010 elections.